The Enigma of Regulatory Takings by Olson, Floyd B.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 7
1994
The Enigma of Regulatory Takings
Floyd B. Olson
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Olson, Floyd B. (1994) "The Enigma of Regulatory Takings," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 20: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/7
THE ENIGMA OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
FLOYD B. OLSONt
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 433
II. THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCESS IN MINNESOTA .. 436
III. STANDARDS IN TAKINGS DECISIONS ...................... 437
A. M innesota Standards .............................. 437
1. Constitutional Provision ........................ 437
2. Court Created Standards ....................... 438
B. Federal Standards ................................. 446
1. Constitutional Provision ........................ 446
2. Court Created Standards ....................... 446
C. The Wegner Standard ............................. 449
IV. THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTION ........................................ 453
A. Adequate and Independent State Grounds ........... 454
B. State Constitutional Claims ........................ 455
C. Interpreting the Minnesota Constitution ............. 456
1. Original Intent ................................ 456
2. The Evolving Constitution ...................... 457
3. The Plain Meaning ............................ 458
4. Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation ........ 458
V. ENLARGEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY ......... 459
A. Property Under Federal Standards ................... 460
B. Property Under State Standards ..................... 461
C. What is Property? ................................. 462
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................... 463
I. INTRODUCTION
The exercise of governmental power to either take private
property for public use upon payment of compensation, or alter-
natively, to use the police power to shift the loss onto owners of
property, has produced some of the most difficult practical and
theoretical issues on the American jurisprudential scene. For
the practitioner, no bright line exists to predict when govern-
mental liability might attach. Regardless of judicially admitted
t The author is the Civil Deputy City Attorney with the City of Minneapolis and
serves as an adjunct Professor of Law for William Mitchell College of Law.
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futility, disputes over which of the powers of government are be-
ing exercised propels this search for the bright line forever on-
ward at both the federal and state levels. While attempting to
establish more workable standards, Minnesota courts have pro-
vided useful insights on how the judicial power should be exer-
cised. The exercise of judicial power occurs within the
framework of a state constitution that grants independent con-
trol to each coordinate branch of government over powers fall-
ing within their respective spheres.
In marking the "bright line" on the federal level, the Holme-
sian dictum in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,1 "that while prop-
erty may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking, "2 is more of an observation
about the difficulty in deciding when compensation should be
paid than it is a rule capable of precise application. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court made a similar observation in State ex rel.
Lachtman v. Houghton3 when it recognized that "[t]he dividing
line between restrictions which may be lawfully imposed under
the police power and those which invade the rights [to just com-
pensation] secured . . . by the constitutional provisions . . . has
never been distinctly marked out, and probably cannot be."' In
the highest courts of each level of government, the practitioner
will find similar gratuitous comments expressing a certain futility
in applying simple standards to the claims of clients.
Nonetheless, if making educated guesses about what courts
will do remains the goal of lawyers in representing clients, a
more forthright and broader analysis can contribute to a higher
incidence of correct guesses. Although the legal profession as-
pires to define the consistency and coherence between similar
but unconnected cases, this Article takes a different direction
and presumes that some benefit can be derived from explaining
why consistency is so elusive.
The term "regulatory taking" is broadly applied to nonphysical
interferences with property rights. A taking usually occurs
through the enactment of a rule or regulation under circum-
stances where the government must respond in eminent domain
rather than avoid liability under the police power. When this is
1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. Id. at 415.
3. 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W. 1017 (1916).
4. Id. at 230, 158 N.W. at 1019.
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determined to have occurred, inverse condemnation5 is the judi-
cial remedy. Whether the remedy should be given will depend
upon how the court rationalizes its decision. Several phenom-
ena, some of which have only recently developed, bear upon the
judicial rationalization used to decide whether the remedy is
warranted.
Of immediate concern are four emerging phenomena that
present some lack of clarity for practitioners, and, perhaps, the
courts. This Article will attempt to describe and assess these phe-
nomena. First, at both the federal and the state levels, appellate
courts have created multiple standards to resolve regulatory tak-
ings cases.6 Second, the bill of rights of both the Minnesota
Constitution and the United States Constitution are being rein-
terpreted in such a way that each must be independently applied
in regulatory takings cases.7 Third, the concept of property for
purposes of eminent domain liability is being enlarged, particu-
larly by the United States Supreme Court.' Finally, appellate
courts do not clearly and consistently define their role with re-
spect to the other coordinate branches of government in decid-
ing regulatory takings cases.9 Each of these phenomena play an
important part in casting shadows on the not so bright line be-
tween the threshold of government liability for a taking and the
uncompensable exercise of the police power.
5. For a definition of inverse condemnation, see infra note 10 and accompanying
text.
6. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(applying a two-factor test to the issue of what constitutes a taking); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (using a three-part test to determine
the legal effect of a regulation); Czech v. City of Blaine, 312 Minn. 535, 536, 253 N.W.2d
272, 274 (1977) (applying a standard focusing on the number of reasonable uses of the
property remaining after imposing the regulation); Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports
Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (1974) (setting forth a separate
standard specific to cases involving aircraft noise); see also Floyd B. Olson, Stare Decisis in
Public Law and Policy, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 361, 370-72 (1989). The author
suggests that the multiplicity of tests, factors, and standards are often created to suit the
result desired, thereby obscuring the rationale in applying them. Id.
7. For an extremely insightful analysis of this phenomenon, see Rita C. DeMeules,
Minnesota's Variable Approach to State Constitutional Claims, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 163
(1991). For an earlier article dealing with the independent interpretation of state con-
stitutions, see Terrencej. Fleming &Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in
the Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 57-77 (1984) (exploring the power, the
propriety, and the criteria in independent state interpretations of state constitutions).
8. For a complete background on this phenomenon as it applies to the concept of
property in general, see MORTON J. HoRwnTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960, at 145-67 (1992) [hereinafter HoRwrrz 1870-1960].
9. Olson, supra note 6, at 363-69.
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II. THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCESS IN MINNESOTA.
Virtually all inverse condemnation actions originate by writ of
mandamus to compel the governmental unit to take property as
if the governmental action were to be affirmatively accomplished
by a legislative declaration of the governing body. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court has defined inverse condemnation as "[t] he
popular description of a cause of action against a governmental
defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by
the taking agency."1 °
The function of the trial court, even though no physical dam-
age has occurred, is to determine whether the property rights of
an owner have been taken or damaged in the constitutional
sense.' This is a matter of law for the court.' 2 If the facts are
undisputed and the mandamus court finds a taking, the court
specifies in its order the nature, extent and date of taking.13 The
court also makes specific findings identifying the reasons sup-
porting the takings determination. 4 If the facts are in dispute, a
jury resolves the disputed facts and "the judge then rules
whether the facts as found by the jury legally constitute a
taking." 5
Inverse condemnation claims against the government are fre-
quently brought on multiple theories. In Wilson v. Ramacher,'6
the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the facts, as
10. Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216 N.W.2d
651, 657 (1974) (quoting Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 101 (Or. 1962)).
The court of appeals also has stated that even without a physical taking, condemnation
proceedings are required if the state's actions damage property in such a way that rises
to the level of a compensable taking. See Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200,
205 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). In Fitger, however, the court ruled that if the government
makes it clear that it wants to abandon a plan to take, no taking will be found. Id. at
208.
11. See, e.g., Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 476, 170 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1969)
(remanding for findings on constitutional property damage); see also State v. Prow's
Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 4, 171 N.W.2d 83, 84 (1969) (citing Thomsen and remanding
for determinations of property damage in a constitutional sense).
12. See, e.g., Thomsen, 284 Minn. at 474, 170 N.W.2d at 580; Prow's Mote4 285 Minn.
at 4-5, 171 N.W.2d at 85.
13. Prow's Mote4 285 Minn. at 6-7, 171 N.W.2d at 86.
14. Thomsen, 284 Minn. at 474, 170 N.W.2d at 580.
15. Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 317 N.W.2d 352, 360 (Minn. 1982);
accord Thomsen, 284 Minn. at 474, 170 N.W.2d at 580.
16. 352 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1984).
[Vol. 20
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pleaded, alleged an invasion of private property through diver-
sion of surface water despite the fact that the landowner could
not recover on a tort theory for diversion of surface waters.
17
Though the remedy was misconceived, the court held that the
plaintiffs failure to artfully plead should not prevent him from
proceeding under a claim of inverse condemnation."' However,
a petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus directing in-
verse condemnation where other legal remedies exist.19
III. STANDARDS IN TAKINGS DECISIONS.
Minimal research will convince even the novice practitioner
that takings standards are often conflicting and confusing be-
cause they differ depending, first, on whether the Minnesota or
United States Constitution is applicable and, second, on the na-
ture of the claimed taking.
A. Minnesota Standards.
1. Constitutional Provision.
Article I, section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution provides
that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed, or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation therefore first
paid or secured."2 The language "destroyed or damaged" was
not a part of the original constitution, 21 but was added by
amendment in 1896 to overrule court interpretations that de-
nied consequential or indirect damages.22 Nevertheless, at the
17. Id. at 394.
18. Specifically, the court stated that the "plaintiff should [not] be denied the right
to proceed in inverse condemnation where his pleadings set out the requisite facts for a
taking and plaintiff has simply neglected to supply the proper label for the remedy he
seeks." Id. at 395.
19. See, e.g., Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. State, 294 Minn. 510, 200 N.W.2d 295
(1972) (reversing grant of mandamus where plaintiff could resort to the remedy sup-
plied by the state's hold-harmless agreement with its contractors); City of Rushford Vil-
lage v. Darr, 389 N.W.2d 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1986)
(reversing eminent domain proceeding and remanding case for determination of statu-
tory damages).
20. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
21. Dickerman v. City of Duluth, 88 Minn. 288, 288, 92 N.W. 1119, 1119 (1903).
22. Id. See, e.g., Henderson v. City of Minneapolis, 32 Minn 319, 20 N.W. 322
(1884) (holding that an action will not lie against a municipality for consequential dam-
ages to property abutting a public street caused by a lawful and proper change of an
established grade); see also Fred L. Morrison, An Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution,
20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 287 (1994).
1994]
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turn of the century, this provision, as amended, was not consid-
ered applicable to a proper exercise of the police power.
2 3
2. Court Created Standards
Minnesota courts have recognized compensable takings when
property or its use has been lost or diminished as the result of
physical appropriation or damage, zoning ordinances, dedica-
tion, interim zoning or moratoria, and historical preservation
regulations. Takings, however, need not be physical or even the
result of government regulation; courts have found takings as
the result of airport noise, interference with air, light, or view,
and the loss of access to and from property. The following sec-
tions attempt to demonstrate the complexities of judicially rec-
ognized takings in Minnesota by summarizing representative
cases in each circumstance.
a. Physical Takings
Where a physical appropriation of a permanent nature results
from government action, there is a taking under both the Min-
nesota and United States Constitutions. In Spaeth v. City of Plym-
outh,24 the use of a private owner's property for a ponding area
by government planning, even though not included in a petition
to condemn, resulted in a taking cognizable in an inverse con-
demnation action. Under this standard, "permanent" means a
servitude of indefinite duration even though it may be an inter-
mittent physical invasion.26 Even without invasion, physical dam-
aging of an innocent third party's property by the police in the
course of apprehending a felony suspect will also require pay-
ment ofjust compensation.27 The United States Supreme Court
23. See HAROLD F. KUMM, THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA ANNOTATED 46 (1924).
24. 344 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1984).
25. Id. at 822. See also Caponi v. Carlson, 392 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that city's adoption of plans to install two storm sewer pipes which vastly
increased water volume in holding pond was a taking in violation of both the state and
federal constitutions).
26. Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 822. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the Supreme Court stated that under the Consti-
tution "when the 'character of the governmental action' is a permanent physical occu-
pation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit
or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." Id. at 434-35 (citation omitted).
27. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1991). The
court's approach is a novel application of the state's constitutional provision on emi-
[Vol. 20
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has expressed similar views to establish takings under the United
States Constitution where physical intrusions have occurred.28
b. Land Use Regulation as a Taking
(i.) Zoning and Rezoning: The No Reasonable Use Test
The supreme court has not hesitated to hold that the refusal
to grant a rezoning request will constitute a taking of property
where all reasonable use of the property was disallowed.29 In
Czech v. City of Blaine,"0 the court concluded that "the evidence
compels a finding that the public health, safety, and welfare will
not be endangered by such a development on the property.""1
The issue of what constituted reasonable uses was specifically ad-
dressed in Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed Distric 2 where a
flood plain ordinance did not prevent some alternate uses. The
Minnesota Supreme Court found alternate uses to be reasonable
where the land could have been "used agriculturally; to meet
open-space requirements of the zoning code; as a density credit
area; for golf driving ranges, parking lots, recreation uses, set-
back areas; or for any use which would not impede the flow of
nent domain. Exactly where the decision fits into takings jurisprudence is unclear. For
an in-depth discussion, see notes 124-44 and accompanying text.
28. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(holding that physical occupation of property occurred in connection with cable televi-
sion company's installation of cables notwithstanding that statute might be within
state's police power) with Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1984)
(finding a taking that occurred through flooding) and Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins.
Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (finding a compensable taking where police fired tear
gas into home during the course of apprehending armed suspect).
29. See, e.g., Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962);
Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1984).
30. 312 Minn. 535, 253 N.W.2d 272 (1977).
31. Presumably, if the court had found endangerment, compensation would not be
required, since the refusal would have been a proper exercise of the police power. Id.
at 538, 253 N.W.2d at 275; see, e.g., Holaway v. City of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28, 30-31
(Minn. 1978) (stating that inverse condemnation was inappropriate where city simply
rezoned land from residential to commercial after annexation because mere diminu-
tion in value is not a taking under article I, § 13 of the Minnesota Constitution); BBY
Investors v. City of Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 635 (Minn. CL App. 1991) (holding
that the trial court's denial of a conditional use permit to construct a high density
apartment complex on land zoned commercial was not a taking of property); County of
Wright v. Kennedy, 415 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Minn. CL App. 1987) (holding that owner
did not show that county zoning ordinance requiring restrictions on width and pitch of
roof of mobile home deprived owner of all alternative uses of property).
32. 283 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 1979) (stating that determination of whether valid
encroachment regulation constitutes a taking requires balancing harm to society by
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surface waters."33 The United States Supreme Court applied a
similar "categorical rule" under the Constitution in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal CounciP4 that appears to be more restric-
tive than Krahl in recognizing the remaining reasonable uses.35
(ii.) Zoning and Rezoning: The Arbitration/Enterprise
Zoning Test
According to the "arbitration/enterprise zoning" test attrib-
uted to Professor Sax36 and applied in McShane v. City of Fari-
bault,"7 a taking results if, first, an ordinance regulates for the
benefit of a governmental enterprise-in this case, for the Fari-
bault Municipal Airport-rather than as an "arbitration" of com-
peting land uses, and, second, the landowner's property is
substantially diminished in value.
Notably, McShane did not acknowledge a 1971 article by Pro-
fessor Sax in which he repudiated his earlier views on the basis
that regulation was too complex for such a test."8 Despite the
disfavored status, Minnesota has expanded the test. In Pratt v.
Department of Natural Resources,39 the court held that a taking may
be established where "the enterprise and arbitration functions
emerge from [a] ... wild rice regulatory scheme."40 Where both
the enterprise and arbitration purposes are prominent, as op-
posed to the situation in McShane, "a taking may occur if the
landowner's property is substantially diminished in value. 41
However, not every regulation can be challenged successfully
under the arbitration/enterprise test. Thus, in Thompson v. City
of Red Wing,4 2 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Minne-
33. Id. at 543.
34. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
35. Id. at 2893.
36. SeeJoseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
37. 292 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. 1980).
38. See Maryland Port Admin. v. Q.C. Corp., 529 A.2d 829, 833 (Md. 1987) (citing
Sax, supra note 37, at 149 wherein Professor Sax rejects his earlier views); see also Floyd
B. Olson, The Arbitration/Enterprise Test in Regulatory Takings, 12 URa., ST. ANn Loc. L.
NEWSL. 3 (Spring 1989) (reviewing the Sax test in the context of environmental regula-
tion). Therein it is argued: "what the arbitration/enterprise test fails to recognize is
that though a governmental enterprise might be benefitted through regulation, the
purpose of regulation is to benefit the public, not some enterprise separated from the
public interest." Id. at 11.
39. 309 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1981).
40. Id. at 774; see also McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 257.
41. Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 774.
42. 455 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 20
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sota Statute section 307.08(2) which prohibits destruction, muti-
lation, injury or removal of human burials was not regulation for
a governmental enterprise. 4' According to the court, "regula-
tions for the purpose of historic preservation do not constitute
enterprise functions."4 4 Moreover, property owners must show a
substantial and measurable decline in market value as a result of
the regulations in order to show diminution of value. 45 To de-
cide whether the diminution is "definite and measurable," a
court may determine whether there exists a market to be dimin-
ished. If there is no demand, there is no diminution.
Finally, in Spaeth v. City of Plymouth,46 the Minnesota Supreme
Court clarified, to some degree, when the test was applicable.
The arbitration/enterprise test "applies only where government
has allegedly taken property by regulating property use and not
where, as here, government has physically appropriated prop-
erty."47 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,48 the
United States Supreme Court also considered this test, and simi-
larly refused to find that historical preservation regulations con-
stituted a governmental enterprise.
(3) Dedications as a Taking: The Reasonably Related Test
In Collis v. City of Bloomington,49 the Minnesota Supreme Court
required a reasonable relationship between the exactions in a
subdivision and the municipality's need for land by dedication
on the plat. The court followed the rationale applied by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Jordon v. Village of Menomonee Falls'0
which distinguished subdivision controls from other takings by
viewing the subdivision control exactions as a business regula-
tion required for development.
51
43. Id. at 517.
44. Id.
45. Keenan v. International Falls-Koochiching County Airport Zoning Bd., 357 N.W.2d
397, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The Keenan court, addressing an airport zoning ordi-
nance, mixed the standards applicable to zoning regulations with the standards applica-
ble to nonregulatory noise interferences in the use of property. See also Alevizos v.
Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974).
46. 344 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1984).
47. Id. at 821.
48. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
49. 310 Minn. 5, 17, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1976).
50. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1966).
51. Id. at 449-50.
19941
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The "reasonably related" test is one of four standards courts
apply to determine whether a dedication rises to the level of a
taking and should be considered in comparison with the other
three. First, the "uniquely attributable" test was set forth in Pio-
neer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect.12 This ap-
proach notes that reasonable statutory requests for streets and
public grounds are based upon the theory that the developer of
a subdivision may be required to incur costs specifically and
uniquely attributable to its activities that would otherwise be cast
upon the public.53 Second, the "rational nexus" test is set out in
Land/Vest Properties, Inc, v. Town of Plainfield.54 Where offsite im-
provements can be properly required, the subdivision can be
compelled to bear only the portion of the cost that bears a ra-
tional nexus to the needs created by, and the benefits conferred
upon the subdivision.55 Finally, the "essential nexus" test was ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission.56 This test holds that conditioning a land owner's
building permit upon his granting an easement is a lawful land
use regulation if it substantially furthers governmental purposes
that justify denial of the permit.
(4) Interim Zoning and Moratoria
Under Minnesota state law, interim ordinances are permitted
to "regulate, restrict or prohibit any use, development, or subdi-
vision" if a municipality is conducting or has authorized the con-
ducting of a study, or has held or scheduled a hearing to
consider amendments to its comprehensive plan or official con-
trols."7 The Minnesota Supreme Court established the "author-
ity to adopt moratorium ordinances of limited duration
provided they are enacted in good faith and without discrimina-
tion." 8 In Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbur 9 the Minne-
52. 176 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ill. 1961).
53. Id.; see also RG. Dunbar, Inc. v. Toledo Plan Comm'n, 367 N.E.2d 1193, 1196
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (stating if a subdivision regulation is within statutory grant of
power to municipality and if burden upon subdivision is specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable to its activities, the regulation is permissible).
54. 379 A.2d 200, 201 (N.H. 1977).
55. Id.
56. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
57. MINN. STAT. § 462.355, subd. 4 (1992).
58. See Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52, 64, 245 N.W.2d 819, 825
(1976).
59. 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
[Vol. 20
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sota Court of Appeals held that the municipality's two-year
moratorium did not constitute a categorical taking, even where
the parties stipulated that during the period the owners were
denied all economically viable use of their land.6" This decision
was rendered despite claims that Article V of the United States
Constitution had been violated and that Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council1 and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles 2 required a determination that a categori-
cal taking had occurred.63 Instead, the court of appeals applied
the "three factor inquiry"64 applied in Penn Central,65 and re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the
moratorium effected a compensable taking under that test.
66
(5) Historical Preservation
State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson67 presented the issue of whether
row houses in the City of Red Wing were a protectable resource
under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.6 8 The opinion
cited Penn CentraP for the proposition that historical preserva-
tion ordinances "do not effect a taking of property even though
the value of the property is diminished."7" Justice Wahl, writing
for the court, had some misgivings and suggested that it "would
seem to be more fair and more efficient" if the government were
to initiate condemnation proceedings.7 ' Thus, she stated,
"[w] here control or acquisition of property is for the benefit of
the many, it makes sense that the cost of the control or acquisi-
tion should be borne by all of the taxpayers and not fall on the
few directly affected."
72
60. Id. at 262.
61. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
62. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
63. Id. at 305.
64. Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
65. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
66. Woodbury Place Partners, 492 N.W.2d at 263.
67. 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979).
68. Id. at 87-88 (referring to the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act set out in
MINN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1992)).
69. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
70. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d at 90 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 134).
71. Id.
72. State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 90-91 (Minn. 1979).
1994]
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c. Nonphysical Nonregulatory Takings
Although Minnesota courts cite both physical takings and land
use takings cases to support decisions regarding nonphysical,
nonregulatory takings, this category of government actions is an-
alyzed under its own separate tests.
(1) Airport Noise
Aircraft noise, in and around airports, has been a source of
major litigation throughout the United States7" and seems to in-
vite analysis of airport cases under the arbitration/enterprise test
adopted in McShane v. City ofFairbault.4 It is, however, an invita-
tion that should be rejected. The appropriate analysis was sug-
gested in City of Mankato v. Hilgers,75 a case involving the
acquisition of a navigation easement. According to the court,
"[t] he invasions of... property rights... are not the result of use
regulations imposed by the ordinance but of the actual opera-
tion of the airport."76 Thus, McShane was held not applicable to
airport noise cases. 7 Instead, the test articulated in Alevizos v.
Metropolitan Airports Commission78 applied.
In Alevizos I, the supreme court rejected the use of nuisance
and trespass theories for aircraft noise intrusions, adopting in-
stead, the use of inverse condemnation as the theory for the
case.79 In so ruling, the court required that there be: (a) a "di-
rect and substantial invasion" of property rights of such a magni-
tude that the owner is "deprived of the practical enjoyment of
the property," and (b) "that the invasion results in a definite and
measurable diminution of the market value of the property.
80
To establish invasions of property rights, a claimant must show
73. See, e.g., City of DeKalb v. Town of Cortland, 599 N.E.2d 153, 155 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa City, 492 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Iowa 1992); Offen v.
County Council, 625 A.2d 424, 432-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Curtis Inv. Co. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 592 A.2d 813, 814 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
74. 292 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Minn. 1980).
75. 313 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Minn. 1981).
76. Id. at 613.
77. McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 256 (stating that a variance would be neither adequate
nor appropriate relief in response to the effect of the airport zoning regulations).
78. 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (1974) [hereinafter Alevizos 1]. See also
Ario v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 367 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1985); Alevizos v. Met-
ropolitan Airports Comm'n, 317 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. 1982) [hereinafter Alevizos II];
Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 452 N.W.2d 492, 497-98 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) [hereinafter Alevizos III].
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that (a) the invasions are "not of an occasional nature," (b) are
"repeated and aggravated," and (c) there is a "reasonable
probability" that they will continue."' This test is most effectively
analyzed under the "highly unusual facts" of Thomsen v. State.82
The Thomsen court,"3 considered whether the noise, vibration,
light or fumes caused by vehicular traffic constituted a taking in
an inverse condemnation action. 4 The case raises the issue of
the applicability of the Alevizos I test to vehicular traffic noise. 5
(2) Interference with Air, Light and View
In Haeussler v. Braun," no taking was found where noise barri-
ers were alleged to have interfered with the adjacent owner's air,
light and view.87 The court stated that "[t] he implied easements
for light, air, and view are a limited interest in property, sub-
servient to the public right to travel on the roadway,""8 and con-
cluded that "[i] t is only when the light, air, and view over a public
street are obstructed by improper street uses that an additional
servitude is deemed to be placed upon these implied easements
and a taking can be found." 9 The court found that the abutting
landowners were benefitted by the barriers.90 However, owners
were found not to have benefitted where a skyway connecting a
municipal parking ramp to a central skyway system interferes
with an implied easement of air, light and view. 91
81. Id.
82. 284 Minn. 468, 469-70, 170 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1969) (finding that the state high-
way department's construction of a highway and passing within 10 feet of bedroom and
a wire fence denied plaintiff access to the highway).
83. Id. The facts of Thomsen were such that no physical taking occurred, but an
altered route put a highway within 10 feet of a house. Id.
84. Id. at 473, 170 N.W.2d at 579. See also State v. Prow's Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 4-
5, 171 N.W.2d 83, 85 (1969).
85. See Alevizos I, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (1974).
86. 314 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981) (comparing the applicability of the Alevizos I test
for noise cases with street use and the invasion of property rights of adjacent owners).
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Castor v. City of Minneapolis, 429 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. 1988). Note, how-
ever, that the court of appeals held it to be a proper use. See Castor v. City of Minneapo-
lis, 415 N.W.2d 739, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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(3) Access Takings
The taking of access to and from property has been compensa-
ble by inverse condemnation as a result of the Minnesota deci-
sion in Hendrickson v. State.9 2 The right is to have "reasonably
convenient and suitable access to the main thoroughfare" in at
least one direction. 9 Numerous cases have followed this rule.94
B. Federal Standards
1. Constitutional Provision
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that private property shall not be "taken for public use
without just compensation."95 The language "destroyed or dam-
aged," which appears in the Minnesota Constitution,96 is absent
from its federal counterpart. A comparison of federal and state
court decisions shows that this distinction has produced signifi-
cantly different results.97
2. Court Created Standards
The United States Supreme Court has considered takings
within an equally diverse collection of circumstances, and has
articulated an evolving body of standards by which takings claims
are considered.
a. Physical Takings
When owners of private property are compelled to suffer phys-
ical invasion or occupation of their property, a taking occurs. In
Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp.,98 a New York stat-
ute required a landlord to allow a cable television company to
install its equipment on his property for a charge of not more
than the one-dollar payment which was determined to be reason-
able by a state commission.99 The United States Supreme Court,
92. 267 Minn. 436, 445, 127 N.W.2d 165, 172 (1964).
93. Id. at 446, 127 N.W.2d at 173.
94. One of the most frequently cited cases in this area is State v. Gannons, Inc., 275
Minn. 14, 19, 145 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1966). See also Johnson Bros. Grocery, v. State
Dep't of Highways, 304 Minn. 75, 77, 229 N.W.2d 504, 505 (1975); Bulletin Publish.
Corp. v. City of Cottage Grove, 379 N.w.2d 685, 687 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
97. See Alevizos I, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (1974).
98. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
99. Id. at 421. See also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 828(1) (McKinney 1981-82).
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looking to the character of the governmental action, held that
under Article V of the Constitution there is a taking regardless of
whether the action achieves an important public benefit and im-
poses only minimal economic impact on the owner.100
b. Land Use Regulation as a Taking
(1) The Two-Factor Test
This test, adopted in Agins v. Tiburon,01 was applied in a facial
challenge to the Pennsylvania Subsidence Actl °2 in Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.10 3 Under this view, a land use
regulation can amount to a taking if: (a) it "does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests," or (b) it denies an owner
of the "economically viable use" of land. 104 The Subsidence Act,
like the Kohler Act 1 5 applied in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,106 prohibited the mining of property under the surface
rights of another. Aside from the fact that one case involved bi-
tuminous coal 07 while the other involved anthracite coal they
are strikingly similar.1 8 Their results, however, are markedly dif-
ferent. The Supreme Court, in Keystone, concluded that a taking
under the two-factor test had not occurred because the owners
had not claimed that the Act made it "commercially impractica-
ble" to continue mining operations. 10 9 Only two percent of the
coal in place (approximately twenty-seven million tons) was af-
fected and no evidence was produced to show the percentage of
loss to the "support estate."110
(2) The Three-Factor Test
Adopted in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,"'
this test arose as a result of New York City's efforts to apply its
100. Lorretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
101. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
102. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 1406.1-.21 (Supp. 1993).
103. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
104. Id. at 485.
105. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, §§ 661-71 (1966).
106. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking).
107. 480 U.S. at 478.
108. 260 U.S. at 412.
109. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1987).
110. Id. at 471-72.
111. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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historic preservation law to the Penn Central Station. 1 2 The
Supreme Court reviewed its earlier cases and concluded that tak-
ings actions are "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' 1 3 To ac-
commodate the uniqueness of specific claims, the Court set
forth a three-factor test that focuses on: (a) the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant; (b) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expec-
tations; and, (c) the character of the governmental action. 14
The difficulty in applying the two-factor and three-factor tests
was exemplified in Parranto Bros. v. City of New Brighton"' where
the Minnesota Court of Appeals analyzed a takings claim under
both the Keystone and Penn Central standards. The Parranto court
observed that "[w] hile both the Agins [ (Keystone)] test and the 3-
part Connelly [(Penn Central)] test were applied by the Supreme
Court last term, it is unclear which circumstances dictate the use
of one test or the other."
' 1 6
(3) The Essential Nexus Test
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,117 the Supreme
Court declared a permit condition to be a taking where, in an
opinion considered too restrictive by the dissent,"' the essential
nexus could not be established between the regulation and legit-
imate state interests." 9 Thus, the Court held that the dedication
of an easement that would have allowed public access to the
beach as a condition for building a large residence on the Cali-
fornia coastline constituted a taking.
121
112. Id. at 104.
113. Id. at 124.
114. Id.
115. 425 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1988).
116. Id. at 591.
117. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
118. Id. at 843 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Id. at 866 (Blackmun & Ste-
vens, A., dissenting).
119. Id. at 825-26.
120. Id. at 841-42. But see Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N.W.2d 19,
20 (1976) (authorizing a municipality to require dedication of land or payment of fees
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(4) Modification of the Two-Factor Test
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,121 the Supreme
Court reviewed a case in which the state Beachfront Manage-
ment Act 12 2 prevented the owner of two residential lots from
building homes on a South Carolina barrier reef island.1 23 The
Supreme Court concluded that "we have found categorical treat-
ment appropriate . . . where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land."1 24 Whether the addition of the
words "beneficial or productive" actually alters the Keystone test is
unclear. On remand, the lower court was to decide the state law
question of whether common law property principles would
have prevented the construction of any "habitable or produc-
tive" improvements on the beach.12 5 The Court emphasized,
however, that although the legislature deemed such uses as in-
consistent with the public interest, this fact could not be consid-
ered on remand.
1 26
C. The Wegner Standard
The question of how to apply standards to determine when
just compensation is paid for takings may appear to be mere
guesswork for practitioners who enter the arena of regulatory
takings for the first time. Equally frustrating is the government
lawyer's task of advising clients as to what differentiates a com-
pensable taking from a noncompensable exercise of the police
power under eminent domain. On one side, practitioners will
find categorical rules which are applied without regard to the
public purpose or use issue. In these cases either physical or title
invasions or total diminutions of value or uses must be clear. On
the other extreme, equity is the general approach of the courts.
121. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Compare id. with Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed
Dist., 283 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 1979) (regulating of floodplain encroachment by
riparian owners is a sufficient use that prevents a finding of a taking where the harm
posed to society by lack of regulation outweighs impact of regulation on usability of the
land).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. 1994).
123. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
124. Id. at 2893 (emphasis added). See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
125. 112 S. Ct at 2901.
126. Id. at 2901. The Court stated that South Carolina must identify "background
principles" of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses intended in the property
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While "mere diminution in value" cannot be the basis for a
taking claim, the three-factor test of Penn Central injects the ele-
ment of fairness, or a noncategorical approach, into the deci-
sion.12'7 The efforts of both the state and federal appellate courts
to give definition to what may be an indefinable threshold be-
tween the police power and eminent domain have yielded only
profound confusion for practitioners. The real bases for many
of these decisions may simply be an unarticulated sense of fair-
ness or justice that is shrouded in a cloud of paraphrased quotes
from unreconciled state and federal decisions.
Recent examples that illustrate the difficulty in deciding these
cases can be found in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.12 8
and McGovern v. City of Minneapolis.1 29 In Wegner, the Minneapo-
lis police department severely damaged a house into which a sus-
pected felon had fled.13 0 The city denied Wegner's claim for
$71,000 in damages.13 ' Wegner then sought recovery against
her insurance carrier, who paid $28,006, and was subrogated to
the claims of Wegner against the city to the extent of its pay-
ments.13 2 Both the insurance carrier and the City brought mo-
tions for summary judgment after Wegner sought recovery from
a claimed trespass and taking under article I, section 13 of the
Minnesota Constitution.13 3 A partial summary judgment was
granted in favor of the city by the district court on the taking
issue. The court of appeals held that although there was a
taking under the state constitution, it was noncompensable
under the doctrine of public necessity.' 35 In rejecting the de-
fense of public necessity, the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded that "in situations where an innocent third party's
property is taken, damaged or destroyed by the police in the
course of apprehending a suspect, . . . the municipality . . .
127. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
128. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
129. 480 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1992).





135. Wegnirr 479 N.W.2d at 39-40. But see Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn.
1992) (reinforcing public necessity doctrine by extending immunity to a police officer
and the officer's municipality where a child was killed during a high speed chase).
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[must] compensate the innocent party for the resulting
damages."
13 6
Wegner is both anomalous and instructive. Although the
supreme court analyzed the case under a "plain meaning" appli-
cation of article I, section 13 of the Minnesota Constitution, it
simultaneously "agree [d] that this [was] not an eminent domain
action and should not be analyzed as such."'3 7 The Wegner court
treated as significant "the requirement that the taking or damag-
ing must be for a public use,"'13 and concluded that "reasonable-
ness" was not an issue in the case.'3 9  Further, the court
obliterated the traditional distinction between the reasonable
exercise of the police power-consistently held to be noncom-
pensable-and a compensable taking or damaging under the
power of eminent domain.
40
Significantly, the requirement of "public use" is apparently
met through exercises of the police power for the health, safety
and welfare of the public. The Minnesota Supreme Court found
the public use requirement for an eminent domain analysis suffi-
cient because "[t] he capture of this individual most certainly was
beneficial to the whole community."14' The problem with this
view is that all land use regulations and the demolition of haz-
136. Id. at 42.
137. Id. at 40. The Superior Court of New Jersey reached the same conclusion in a
similar case without citing Wegner. SeeWallace v. City of Atlantic City, 608 A.2d 480 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992). The Wallace court applied the "intended benefit" test, stat-
ing in relevant part:
Under this test if the particular intended beneficiary was the public, rather
than a private individual, compensation would be warranted. However, if the
particular intended beneficiary was a private individual, rather than the public
as a whole, there would be no entitlement to just compensation even if the
public was an incidental beneficiary.
Id. at 483.
138. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 40.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 40; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16
(1922). Wegner seems to imply that legal classification of these two competing doctrines
is irrelevant since "simply labeling the actions of the police as an exercise of the police
power 'cannot justify the disregard of the constitutional inhibitions.'" Wegner, 479
N.W.2d at 40 (citing In re Droesch, 233 Minn. 274, 282, 47 N.W.2d 106, 111 (1951)).
141. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42. The meaning of the term "public use" is not clear.
See, e.g., State ex rel Twin City Bldg. Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159
(1920) (holding that although public use is required for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, it should not be confused with the public purpose doctrine applied in
the expenditure of public money). Thus, in Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89
N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958), the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that while railroads
and public utilities may condemn property for uses declared public, public money may
not necessarily be spent to purchase the property.
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ardous buildings are for the benefit of the whole community. If
"benefit to the whole community" is the equivalent of "public
use," it might logically be argued that any loss in property value
as a result of governmental activity, whether done under the po-
lice power or not, should be compensated.
For the first time, the supreme court has determined that the
owner's culpability will affect the application of constitutional
rights under article I, section 13 of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion.t42 Thus, "where an innocent third party's property is... dam-
aged.., by the police in the course of apprehending a suspect,"
that property is damaged within the meaning of the constitu-
tion. 4 3 Surely, questions of what "innocent" means, and who
"third parties" are, will arise. In the execution of no-knock war-
rants in drug cases the owner may be "innocent" but the tenant
may be culpable. How the case would apply to innocent mort-
gage holders or lien holders is unclear, as are the elements nec-
essary to prove culpability. At this point, cases such as McGovern
v. City of Minneapolis144 do not provide guidance in this area.
Although the supreme court could have decided Wegner based
on precedents that compensate for physical invasions or occupa-
tions of private property, the court ultimately rested its decision
on notions of fairness and equity.1 45 A critical analysis would di-
rect that where broad policy grounds are implicated, the court
should have used the approach applied in Spanel v. Mounds View
School District No. 621146 to defer any policy action to the state
legislature.
14 7
Note that the Wegner court addressed public uses, while in McGovern v. City of
Minneapolis, 480 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), the court addressed property set
aside for public purposes. Further, in City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763
(Minn. 1986), the court indicated that "[h ] istorically, the court has used the words 'pub-
lic use' interchangeably with the words 'public purpose.'" However, in the Wegner anal-
ysis, "public use" for eminent domain purposes is not the same as acting for the
purpose of the health, safety and welfare of the public.
142. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
143. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
144. 480 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). However, the supreme court has stated
that "the issue is whether it is fair to allocate the entire risk of loss to an innocent
homeowner for the good of the public." Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
145. Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 42.
146. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
147. The result was Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 466 which was adopted in 1963. See
MINN. STAT. § 466 (1994). The statute proscribes tort liability for political subdivisions
and addresses, among other issues, maximum liability, liability insurance, indemnifica-
tion and payment of judgements. Id.
[Vol. 20
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IV. THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
In 1984, Terrence Fleming and Jack Nordby reported that
"[a]t least [thirty-two] state courts have interpreted their state
constitutions as providing more expansive safeguards for the
rights of their citizens than the minimum protection required by
the Federal Constitution. 148 Another author has suggested that
the reason for judicial atrophy in state constitutional law was the
expansion of federal doctrines under the Warren Court era.
149
Shirley Abrahamson, in Reincarnation of State Courts,15 0 concluded
that "[a] s the federal constitutional guarantees grew during the
Warren Court years, the protection of individual rights under
the state constitutions almost came to a halt."51  Now, however,
the appointment of new members to the United States Supreme
Court, who reflect different governmental and economic philos-
ophies, has led to a rediscovery of state constitutions.1 52 Minne-
sota is no exception to this trend.1
5
3
148. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7, at 52 n.3.
149. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1981).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 957.
152. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170 (Del. 1990) (stating that failure of police
to inform defendant his attorney was on telephone was denial of right to counsel guar-
anteed under state constitution); Beirkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1980)
(stating that guest statute violates state equal protection provision); People v. Jackson,
217 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1974) (requiring counsel at photo lineup and rejecting the hold-
ing in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)).
153. See, e.g., State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. 1992) (addressing the
issue of obscenity, the court stated that "in appropriate cases we will construe liberties
more broadly under the state constitution than under the federal"); Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) (stating that the free speech clause may
be broader under state constitution); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn.
1991) (finding state equal protection more demanding than under federal provisions);
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (finding greater religious lib-
erty under Minnesota Constitution than under the First Amendment); State v. Gray,
413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987) (stating that fundamental rights are not limited by
United States Constitution); see also Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473
N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991) (claiming it appropriate for state courts to consider
protections afforded by state constitution more expansively and doing so with regard to
individuals' right to counsel); Hill Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch.,
471 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that language of the state constitu-
tion is broader and more emphatic than United States Constitution relating to religious
freedoms); State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988) (finding that the Minne-
sota Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's right to a 12 person jury); State v.
Fuller, 350 N.W.2d 382, 386 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting identical language
regarding double jeopardy more expansively in state constitution than United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution).
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A. Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Takings claims can avoid review by the federal courts, where
constitutional claims can plausibly be made, by asserting a state
constitutional claim and foregoing the claim under a parallel
provision in the United States Constitution. 54 Wegner provides a
good local example of this strategy, since the opinion rested
solely on reference to article I, section 13 of the Minnesota
Constitution.
1 55
In Michigan v. Long, 1 6 the United States Supreme Court based
its decision on "[t] he principle that we will not reviewjudgrnents
of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds."' 5 7 Prior to Long, if it was unclear to the United States
Supreme Court that the decision was based on adequate and in-
dependent state grounds, the Court would "require state courts
to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions."' 5
To avoid confusion, Long established a new procedural rule,
which coincided with the retreat from earlier "more liberal"
rights enlarging precedents, known as the "plain statement"
rule.' 59 The Court concluded that "we merely assume that there
154. The long-established rule holds that where no federal rights are denied, and
the state decision is based on independent and adequate state grounds, it is not review-
able by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040-41 (1983).
155. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 40-42 (Minn. 1991).
156. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
157. Id. at 1041-42.
158. Id. at 1040.
159. The Court, in examining its earlier treatment of cases involving references to
state law, found its treatment unsatisfactory and inconsistent. Id. at 1032. Thus, the
Supreme Court held that the ad hoc method formerly employed would no longer be
followed. Id. In respect of state courts' independence, the Court established a new rule
for determining when it would examine cases:
[W] hen.., a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law,
or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and indepen-
dence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opin-
ion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court
decided the case the way it did because it believed that the federal law re-
quired it to do so.
Id. at 1040-41. Assuming, however, the state court decision clearly and expressly indi-
cates that its decision is based upon independent grounds, the Supreme Court has
stated that it will respect the decision and forego review:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in itsjudgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court
has reached.
Id. at 1041 (emphasis added).
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are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself
that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent
state ground." 6 '
The plain statement rule may be the reason for the anomalous
language in Wegner, which states "[w]e agree that this is not an
eminent domain action and should not be analyzed as such."'
6'
The court, however, then adds "[t] his action is based on the plain
meaning of the language of [Minnesota Constitution article I,
section 13], which requires compensation when property is dam-
aged for a public use."' 62
B. State Constitutional Claims
If the use of multiple federal and state standards burdens
practitioners and judges in inverse condemnation cases, the
search for consistency in state constitutional claims is no less a
burden. 63 For example, earlier in this century the Minnesota
Supreme Court acknowledged that interpretations of due pro-
cess under the Minnesota Constitution were controlled by deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court because the
fundamental principles of due process were common to both
constitutions. 164 This approach has changed over time. In 1991,
in State v. Davidson, 65 the court of appeals concluded that Min-
nesota Statutes section 617.241166 was void for vagueness, and
presumably decided the case under article I, section 7 of the
state constitution. 67 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found the statute not void for vagueness under the Minnesota
160. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).
161. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1991).
162. Id.
163. SeeDeMeules, supra note 7. The author points out that "[t]here is no consistent
approach by the Minnesota Supreme Court to questions of state constitutional law." Id.
at 167 n.14.
164. See KUMM, supra note 23, at 34 (citing W.J. Armstrong Co. v. New York Cent. &
Hudson River R.R., 129 Minn. 104, 151 N.W. 917 (1915)).
165. 471 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
166. MINN. STAT. § 617.241 (1992) (delineating Minnesota's obscenity statute).
167. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. The court, in addressing the due process issue, im-
pliedly decided the case on state grounds, but failed to make that point clear. Davidson,
471 N.W.2d at 696-700. Judge Randall, writing for the court, stated that "[a] statute
which provides the basis of a criminal prosecution must meet due process standards
under both the Minnesota and the United States Constitution." Id. at 696. However,
Judge Amundson decided the case solely on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 702-03
(Amundson, J., concurring specially).
19941
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Constitution. 68 Although the court believed that the respon-
dent could prevail only if a higher level of due process were re-
quired under article I, section 7 than under the Federal
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 it did not decide whether a higher
level was, indeed, required under the Minnesota Constitution.
70
Again, in 1992, in State v. Reha,171 a City of Minneapolis ordi-
nance was upheld under a void for vagueness challenge to the
words "clean and sanitary" without specific reference to either
the federal or state constitutional due process provisions.'
72
Under equal protection principles, the Minnesota Supreme
Court indicated that it will apply a "more stringent" and "in-
dependent" constitutional test for rational basis review than
found under the Federal Constitution.
173
C. Interpreting the Minnesota Constitution
1. Original Intent
The notion that the framers' original intent should be con-
sulted in constitutional interpretation is an old one, 174 and is the
focus of debate in understanding the Federal Constitution. In
Minnesota, ascertaining original intent is far more difficult for
several reasons. First, the Minnesota Constitutional Convention,
called in 1857, divided on the first day into Democratic and Re-
publican constituencies, which met separately. 75 Second, after
two constitutions were separately drafted, a conference commit-
tee was established to compose a single constitution. 176 Third,
after adoption, the Supreme Court did not agree that original
intent should be considered in ascertaining the meaning of the
168. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. 1992).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 483 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 1992).
172. Id. at 690-93.
173. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991). The court acknowledged
that it "has not been consistent in explaining whether the rational basis standard under
Minnesota law, although articulated differently, is identical to the federal standard or
represents a less deferential standard under the Minnesota Constitution." Id. One
might wonder what impact this statement has for prior decisions in which the Minne-
sota Supreme Court applied an earlier, different rational basis test.
174. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 7, at 56.
175. 1 WiLLIAM W. FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA, 397-421 (rev. ed. 1956).
176. Folwell reports that "[n]o minutes of the proceedings have been found." Id. at
417. Further, he states that "[t]he document before the United States Senate on January
11, 1858 was beyond doubt this copy of the Democratic constitution." Id. at 421 n.43.
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constitution. 177 Next, the debates focused largely on the deter-
mination of state boundaries and contained very little on the bill
of rights.1 71 In addition, the models on which the Minnesota
constitution was based differed depending on which convention
is considered. 179 Finally, many judges and attorneys simply do
not believe that history should be used as an aid to interpreting
constitutional provisions as applied to contemporary
conditions. 180
2. The Evolving Constitution
The doctrine of original intent can be criticized as being too
static. Levy aptly notes that "[t] he worthy belief that the experi-
ence of the past represents a fund of knowledge for our direc-
tion may degenerate into the idolatry of blindly following some
particular embodiment of that past 'wisdom.' "181 The notion of
a developing constitution relies not on rigid adherence to origi-
nal intent but on an application of past actions to explain a mod-
ern interpretation. Here, constitutional principles represent an
evolving historical process gleaned from precedent. As Cardozo
has pointed out, some bodies of law owe their existing form al-
most exclusively to history.1 82 Where constitutional growth is
177. ChiefJustice Wilson, a member of the Republican convention, stated that "we
think such debates should not influence a [c]ourt in expounding a constitution in any
case." See Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107, 126, 10 Gil. 81, 99 (1865). This view was not,
however, universally accepted. Specifically, ChiefJustice Emmett, who was a member of
the Democratic convention, felt that reference to the debates was of great assistance.
See, e.g., Minnesota & Pac. R.R. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13, 19, 2 Gil. 1, 8 (1858).
178. One case specifically recognizes the importance of the separate Republican and
Democratic constitutional debates in construing the document. See State v. Finnegan,
188 Minn. 54, 60, 246 N.W. 521, 524 (1933) (stating that should the meaning of the
constitution become doubtful, resort to construction if necessary); see also State ex rel.
Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 273, 220 N.W. 951, 957 (1928) (stating that
debates are an aid to be resorted to only in case of doubt).
179. FOLWELL, supra note 171, at 404. Folwell observed:
"The Republican drafts were in the main quite close copies of the Wisconsin
[C]onstitution of 1848. In a few instances Ohio, Michigan, and Iowa examples
were used. The Democrats, while drawing from the same sources, were more
catholic. Their bill of rights appears to be a compound of those of New York
and New Jersey."
Id.
180. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1936). But see Reed v.
Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102 (1934).
181. BERYL H. LEW, CARDOZO AND FROrTERS OF LEGAL THINKING, 58 (1938).
182. BENJAMIN N. CARlozo, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). To more
fully understand the importance of history as an aid to construction of the Minnesota
Constitution, see Minnesota & Pac. R.R. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13, 19, 2 Gil. 1, 8 (1858);
Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 222 Minn. 516, 25 N.W.2d 263 (1946) (looking to "the
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viewed as making written provisions satisfy some desirable social
objective, the method and premises of sociology can be used to
change the meaning of a constitution.
183
3. The Plain Meaning
The methodologies of history and sociology in constitutional
interpretation offer contextual approaches to explain the mean-
ings of constitutions. Applying the "plain meaning of the lan-
guage" avoids the discipline of precedent and clearly understood
social objectives. In Wegner, the traditional analysis of what falls
under the legitimate exercise of the police power and what falls
under eminent domain is absent.18 4 Instead, the "action is based
on the plain meaning of the language of [Minnesota Constitu-
tion article I, section 13] ,"185 an approach that relies on "beliefs"
about fairness and justice, which, in Wegner means deciding who
should bear the risk.
18 6
4. Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation
Actions taken by governmental bodies, and policies with re-
spect to those actions, depend on the legal analysis applied by
lawyers who represent the public interest. If cases are decided in
such a manner as to establish broad public policies without refer-
ences to comparable federal standards, or if decisions are ren-
dered on policy grounds without a clear and consistent
reference to history or well defined and documented social
objectives, the already existing confusion in regulatory takings
becomes more problematic. Where certainty is lacking in consti-
history of the times and the state of things existing when the provision was framed and
adopted to ascertain the mischief and the remedy sought" to construe a restrictive tax
provision of the Minnesota Constitution); Minnesota Baptist Convention v. Pillsbury
Academy, 246 Minn. 46, 74 N.W.2d 286 (1955) (referring to the Minnesota constitu-
tional convention to construe prospective application of MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 33 subd.
10).
183. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896). The separate but equal
doctrine was not subsequently overruled because of a change in the language of the
United States Constitution but as a result of rethinking the social consequence of the
doctrine. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992).
185. Id. at 40
186. Id. at 42. The court emphasized this point in stating that "[wie do not believe
the imposition of such a burden on the innocent citizens of this state would square with
the underlying principles of our system of justice." Id. Use of the "plain meaning"
approach in constitutional analysis does not discredit the "beliefs" or the ultimate out-
come of the case.
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tutional decisions, definition for sound public policy becomes
even more difficult for legislative bodies elected to make such
policies. This is particularly true where similar provisions in fed-
eral and state constitutions are interpreted to create different
legal standards and tests at each level of government.
V. ENLARGEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY
Although the idea of low cost government may be a popular
political view, both federal and state constitution eminent do-
main provisions limit cost-free governmental activity with respect
to "private property." In Morton Horwitz's monumental work,
The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860,187 the develop-
ment of the issue of compensation for land taken or injured by
the government was viewed as having limited importance early
in American history.188 Horwitz uses the law of eminent domain
to trace the movement away from a physicalist conception of
property that took place during the late nineteenth century.
89
In Minnesota, this transformation became part of article I, sec-
tion 13 in 1896, when the state constitution was amended to re-
quire payment of just compensation for indirect or
consequential damages to private property.19 Although the
amendment was designed to require payment for indirect dam-
age to private property, the concept of private property was also
expanded. This expanded view of the so-called "bundle of
rights" for which governmental interference requires payment
187. HoRwrrz 1780-1860, supra note 8. Horwitz advances the thesis that the change
in legal orthodoxy in America from classical legal thought to progressive legal thought
represents a social and economic struggle in which political and moral choices are de-
nied or hidden by a fixation to sharply separate law from politics.
188. Id. at 63. Horwitz observed that "[d]espite the efforts of Thomas Jefferson to
establish the principle ofjust compensation in postrevolutionary Virginia, no law pro-
viding compensation for land taken for roads was enacted until 1785." Id. Further, he
notes that "[u]ntil the nineteenth century, Pennsylvania and New Jersey still denied
compensation on the ground that the original proprietary land grants had expressly
reserved a portion of real property for the building of roads." Id. at 64.
189. Id. at 146.
190. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. Compare Lee v. City of Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 13
(1875) (holding no recovery for consequential damages for change of grade) with Mor-
gan v. City of Albert Lea, 129 Minn. 59, 151 N.W. 532 (1915) (permitting recovery for
substantial change of grade and lateral support). An explanation of the reasons for
amending the state constitution by adding the words "destroyed or damaged" is set
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has resulted in legal standards that embody economic loss as the
measure of interference.19 1
A. Property Under Federal Standards
Historically, state law defines property interests for the pur-
poses of eminent domain. 92 The concepts of property and
property interference are simple as long as common law estates
(fee, leasehold and easement) are the subject of a taking.
Courts have also subscribed to the notion that a taking will not
be found for a mere diminution in the property's value. 193 In
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,"' landowners
failed to show a "deprivation significant enough to satisfy the
heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking."'95
The court applied the standard that land use regulation can
amount to a "taking if it 'does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests .... or denies an owner economically viable
use of the land.' "196 In Keystone, the Supreme Court concluded
that a taking under the "economically viable use" test had not
occurred because the owners had not claimed that the regula-
tion at issue made it commercially impracticable to continue
mining operations."9 7
The "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" approach articulated in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City' applies a three-factor
test that includes "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. '
191. HoRwITz 1870-1960, supra note 8, at 149.
192. See, e.g., County of San Diego v. Cabrillo Lanes, Inc. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 613, 614-
15 (1992); Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Frankford 5206 Bar, Inc., 587 A.2d 855,
860 (Pa. 1991).
193. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see also
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that "mere" diminution was
75%); Hadecheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (indicating that diminution was
87.5%).
194. 480 U.S. at 470.
195. Id. at 493.
196. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (cit-
ing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). This test was previously recognized in both Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) and, earlier, in Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See supra notes 101, 117-20 and accompanying text.
197. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-95
(1992) (applying an "economically beneficial and productive use of land" test).
198. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
199. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hampstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962)).
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Moreover, the Penn Central Court assumed that "development
rights" were "property rights," but held that no taking had oc-
curred because historical preservation restrictions were permissi-
ble under the police power.20 0 These tests, on the federal level,
focus on interference with economic expectations rather than
interference with the classical physicalist conception of property
or common law estates.
B. Property Under State Standards
The notion of "development rights" as property can be seen in
other applications. Under state statute, metropolitan counties
are authorized, for purposes of establishing solid waste facilities,
to acquire development rights. 2 1' The development rights that
must be acquired in "buffer areas" surrounding disposal sites are
defined as the "right[s] of the owner of the fee interest in land to
change the use of the land from its existing use to any other
use." 2 Thus, with one legislative enactment, zoning, which his-
torically involved the exercise of the police power, has been con-
verted to a property right which is now subject to eminent
domain.
In Haeussler v. Braun,2°3 the Minnesota Supreme Court recog-
nized the implied easement for light, air and view as a limited
interest in property that is subservient to the public right to
travel on a roadway.204 The Haeussler court concluded that only
improper street uses would result in an additional servitude be-
ing placed on these implied easements.20 5 Thus, no taking oc-
curred by the placement of noise barriers along the roadway.20 6
An even more expansive notion of property rights can be
found in the recent case of State v. Strom.207 In Strom, construc-
tion-related interferences caused temporary reduction in rental
income of an office building.208 A change of grade also resulted
in loss of visibility to the property that remains after a partial
200. 438 U.S. at 138.
201. MINN. STAT. § 473.811, subd. 1 (1992).
202. MINN. STAT. § 473.833, repealed by 1991 MINN. LAws ch. 337, § 90(b).
203. 314 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981).
204. Id. at 7-8.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 9.
207. 493 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, Coyne, JJ., dissenting in part, Tomija-
novich, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 560-61.
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taking.2°9 The majority opinion concluded that both elements
of damage were admissible in a partial taking case and must be
considered in a determination of the diminution in market value
of the remaining property.21 ° Both Justices Simonett and Coyne
dissented on the first element, but concurred on the issue of loss
of visibility from the road.21 1 Justice Tomjanovich dissented on
both elements.
212
The opinions illustrate the lack of consensus on what is prop-
erty for eminent domain purposes. The majority opinion ex-
pands the elements of damage to be considered in a market
value diminution analysis where a partial taking has occurred.
Justice Simonett, suggested that "[w]hether there is an implied
easement of view to the abutting landowner's property, as well as
from, is an interesting question", which need not be answered.21 3
Justice Tomljanovich concluded that the owner "has a right to
be compensated for the partial taking. However, there is no in-
herent property right to be seen .... -"214
C. What is Property?
Under a physicalist concept of property, where physical intru-
sion, or acquisition of land or buildings takes place, property is
readily definable. However, where indirect loss occurs, the iden-
tity of property rights, as seen in Strom, becomes more elusive.
When reduction in potential development occurs as the result of
209. Id. at 558.
210. Id. at 560-61.
211. Id. at 562, 565.
212. State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 565 (Minn. 1992).
213. Id. at 564. Justice Simonett stated "the question is not whether there has been
the taking of a property interest, an appurtenant easement of view, but whether the
state's use of the land taken ... has caused an unfair, direct, substantial and peculiar
injury to Woodbridge's remainder real estate." Id. He also concluded that "[a]t times,
visibility must yield to proper street improvements." Id. at 565 (citing Haeussler v.
Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1981)).
214. Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 566. Justice Tomljanovich stated that until Strom
Minnesota has never held that a property owner has a right to be seen....
Even if the right to be seen were synonymous with the implied right to a view,
it is not an absolute right but an entitlement to a "view that [is] not obstructed
by a proper street use."
Id. at 565-66 (citing Haeussler v. Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1981)) (emphasis ad-
ded). She further stated that "[a]lthough the ability of the traveling public to see Wood-
bridge has been altered by the grade level change and construction, there is no dispute
that the use of trunk highway 12 as converted to limited access 394 is a proper street
use." Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 566. Justice Tomljanovich viewed the majority decision as a
'revolutionary and dramatic change in condemnation law." Id.
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traditional police power exercises which infringe upon so-called
"development rights," the concept of property becomes con-
fused. In such cases, anticipated profits from entrepreneurial ef-
forts emerge as a property right. The expansion of "property"
subject to payment of just compensation may ultimately rest on
privately held unarticulated assumptions about who ought to
bear the burden of loss-the taxpayer or the private
landowner. 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The quest for certainty and predictability in regulatory takings
cases is affected by all of these enigmatic phenomena. Practi-
tioners are advised to prepare voluminous complaints on behalf
of their clients in order to cover all possible applications of the
panoply of takings standards. The advocate for the landowner
must rely as much on commonly held notions of justice as on
prior case law. How courts respond may depend on privately
held views which cannot be found in case law. The practitioner
is thus obliged to press the client's position as far as allowable
through the appeal process in the effort to obtain a satisfactory
result.
To those practitioners representing governmental bodies, reg-
ulatory takings represent an extremely difficult challenge in as-
sessing the risks of policy decisions. When judicial opinions are
viewed as "result-oriented" or "ad hoc factual inquiries," or de-
cided according to any one of several competing legal standards
written to satisfy changing and competing views of constitutional
interpretations, the discipline offered by reference to historical
experience is absent. Attempting to understand the forces at
215. Note, for example, the majority response to the issue of construction inconven-
ience in State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Minn. 1992). The court allowed such
evidence and rejected the state's policy argument that forecasted the construction of
highway projects would become prohibitively expensive. Addressing the issue of visibil-
ity from the roadway, the court found that the rule of admissibility is "most compatible
with the compensation provision of our state constitution." Id. at 561.
In his dissent, Justice Simonett proposed a test that would ask "whether the inter-
ference unfairly, directly, substantially, and peculiarly causes a diminution in the mar-
ket value of the landowner's property." Id. at 563. While the existence of a partial
taking is important, this dissent would not make it conclusive.
In her dissent,Justice Tomljanovich characterized the decision as "a burden on the
taxpayers that is unfair and unwise." Id. at 566. While technical, legal analysis supports
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work may be the best that the ordinary legal practitioner can
achieve.
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